Re: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-drip-arch-22

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Hi Valery, Bob, 

Many thanks to Valery for the review. 

(focusing on point 3) 

Please see inline. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Robert Moskowitz <rgm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Envoyé : mercredi 30 mars 2022 16:47
> À : Valery Smyslov <valery@xxxxxxxxxxx>; secdir@xxxxxxxx
> Cc : draft-ietf-drip-arch.all@xxxxxxxx; last-call@xxxxxxxx; tm-
> rid@xxxxxxxx
> Objet : Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-drip-arch-22
> 
> I am taking a quick response here, and will have to go over it more
> closely for a second pass.
> 
> On 3/30/22 09:51, Valery Smyslov via Datatracker wrote:
> > Reviewer: Valery Smyslov
> > Review result: Has Issues
> >
> > The topic of the draft is complex and involves many fields which I'm
> > not expert of. The overall architecture looks secure, however it's
> > difficult for me to analyse all the details. Nevertheless, it seems to
> > me that there are some security issues with the draft.
> >

> 
> > 3. Section 9.
> >
> >     The size of the public key hash in the HHIT is also of concern.
> It
> >     is well within current server array technology to compute another
> key
> >     pair that hashes to the same HHIT.
> >
> > If I understand the draft correctly, the size of public key hash is 20
> > or 19 octets (Section 3.1).
> 
> The architecture document does not detail the format of an HHIT.  It
> turns out that in draft-ietf-drip-rid, the hash size is 64 bits so this
> attack is real and details about it are in the Security Considerations
> of that draft.  Perhaps say:
> 
> The size of the public key hash in the HHIT (64 bits) is also of concern
> 
> ?  Do we need to reference ietf-drip-rid?  We really do not want to do
> that is it creates delaying dependencies.

[Med] The initial point was to record the potential security consideration that should be further examined in the solution spec. I'm not convinced we need to call out solution-specific details (e.g., 64 bits) here or call out ietf-drip-rid.  


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