I have read the document. I was unaware of it until it was posted. It seems like this document is fighting some kind of guerilla fight against pressures to provide a higher RoI for doing RPKI. I'm personally really annoyed that ARIN has been so restrictive with access to the public key that can used to validate the RPKI that originates with them. } It has been suggested that one could authenticate real-world business } transactions with the signatures of INR holders. E.g. Bill's Bait and Sushi } could use their AS in the RPKI to sign a Letter of Authorization (LOA) for } some other party to rack and stack hardware owned by BB&S. Unfortunately, } this is not formally feasible. I think that it would be nice if some specific proposals were mentioned. I don't really know what: } no proof of termination means. I feel like this document might better be written by an ARIN or ICANN lawyer in a cease and decist kind of fashion, and that really, adults should be allowed to do whatever they like with their private keys in the privacy of their own HSMs. It isn't clear that we gain by publishing this document. At some poine in the 1990s, I was assured that Dunn & Bradstreet where going to issue certificates useful for business transactions. That never, AFAIK, happened. } Government of Elbonia citation! citation! :-) :-) -- ] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [ ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | IoT architect [ ] mcr@xxxxxxxxxxxx http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails [ -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@xxxxxxxxxxxx> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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