Christian Huitema <huitema@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> I didn't think oblivious-DNS was particularly useful either, because it was >> basically just turning stub resolvers into mutated full resolvers, without >> actually teaching them to do DNSSEC. If they could do DNSSEC, then we could >> trust answers from any place, and then we could do some kind of p2p DNS >> queries to get better anonymization (and probably, more resiliency for DNS). > I used to believe a variation of that, that if users wanted to hide the IP > address of the client sending DNS requests, they could just as well use a VPN > and there would be no need for such "oblivious DNS" service. But it turned I guess that the degenerate case of a p2p DNS is personal VPN. > out that oblivious DNS was easier to deploy than VPN services, and also had > some very nice privacy characteristics. I think that oblivious HTTP has the > same potential, splitting the processing between an initial proxy that knows > the client but does not know the requested URL, and an oblivious proxy that > knows the requested URL but does not know the source IP address of the > client. You have two proxies here. I didn't think that the oblivious HTTP mandated two. -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@xxxxxxxxxxxx> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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