Reviewer: Russ Housley Review result: Almost Ready I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before posting a new version of the draft. For more information, please see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. Document: draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08 Reviewer: Russ Housley Review Date: 2021-05-28 IETF LC End Date: unknown IESG Telechat date: unknown Summary: Almost Ready Major Concerns: Section 9: The document has two different types of keying material: (1) keys for hop-by-hop encryption and authentication; and (2) keys for end-to-end encryption and authentication. The first two paragraphs of Section 9 talks about these two types of keying material. I think that the discussion should be expanded by a sentence or two to explain the security consequences of disclosure of each of theses keying material types. In addition, a pointer to the very extensive Security Consideration in RFC 8871 would he helpful. Minor Concerns: Section 5.4 says: "Each TLS tunnel established between the media distributor and the key distributor MUST be mutually authenticated." Is this a requirement to use DTLS client authentication? If so, please be explicit. If not, what other mechanisms for authentication are expected? Nits: Section 5.1, paragraph 2: s/[!@RFC4566]/[RFC4566]/ Section 5.5, paragraph 1: s/MUST utilize the same version/MUST contain the same version/ Section 8, last paragraph: s/section 4.8 if [!@RFC8126]/Section 4.8 of [RFC8126]/ Section 9, paragraph 1: s/keying material This does/keying material. This does/ -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
