Re: [Last-Call] [AVTCORE] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16

["Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Thanks for the explanation and update.  Your updated draft addresses my concerns.  Perhaps 3.9 should have a forward link to Sec 11

 

From: Gunnar Hellström <gunnar.hellstrom@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Friday, May 7, 2021 at 11:45 AM
To: Rich Salz <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx>, "secdir@xxxxxxxx" <secdir@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: "last-call@xxxxxxxx" <last-call@xxxxxxxx>, "draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix.all@xxxxxxxx" <draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix.all@xxxxxxxx>, "avt@xxxxxxxx" <avt@xxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16

 

Rich,

Thanks for the review.

I am composing a new version because of the Gen-ART review, and want to propose changes to satisfy your comments.

You ask if it is common to have the mixers being trusted.

In the expected first implementation environments for this draft, it is. That is in emergency service networks. Also in personal communication services it is.

The first implementation environments are also expected to use the SIP centralized conference model (RFC 4353 etc.) where all media are expected to be mixed centrally. Thus the security aspects would be similar for audio, video and real-time text.

I have tried to elaborate a bit more on this in a modified security considerations section, currently looking like this and being ready for submission together with the changes because of the Gen-ART review. Would this satisfy your concerns?

--------Proposed security concerns--------------------

11.  Security Considerations

   The RTP-mixer model requires the mixer to be allowed to decrypt,

   pack, and encrypt secured text from the conference participants.

   Therefore the mixer needs to be trusted to achieve security in

   confidentiality and integrity.  This situation is similar to the

   situation for handling audio and video media in centralized mixers.

   The requirement to transfer information about the user in RTCP

   reports in SDES, CNAME, and NAME fields, and in conference

   notifications, for creation of labels may have privacy concerns as

   already stated in RFC 3550 [RFC3550], and may be restricted for

   privacy reasons.  The receiving user will then get a more symbolic

   label for the source.

   Participants with malicious intentions may appear and e.g., disturb

   the multiparty session by emitting a continuous flow of text.  They

   may also send text that appears to originate from other participants.

   Counteractions should be to require secure signaling, media and

   authentication, and to provide higher level conference functions

   e.g., for blocking, muting, and expelling participants.

   Further security considerations specific for this application are

   specified in Section 3.19.

----------------------------------------------------------

Regards

Gunnar

-- 

Gunnar Hellström

GHAccess

gunnar.hellstrom@xxxxxxxxxxx

Den 2021-05-06 kl. 16:36, skrev Rich Salz via Datatracker:

Reviewer: Rich Salz

Review result: Ready

This review is for the benefit of the Security AD's. Nobody else should read

this. Or, if you read it, treat it as any other last call review :)

I know very little about WebRTC, AVT, etc.

I thought Section 1.2, summary of the alternatives, was great. I wish more

documents did this kind of thing. And similar for all of section 2. The details

in Section 3 about how to comply seem very clear. If I were implementing this,

I could use easily use this as a checklist and test suite. Section 3.19 is the

most important one for transport security. Not knowing the operating

environments, it seems reasonable.

The security considerations seems a little scant, given the opportunity for

privacy concerns of participants and for intruders to disrupt calls. Is it

common that the mixer is a trusted entity? A statement on that either way would

be useful.

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-- 

Gunnar Hellström

GHAccess

gunnar.hellstrom@xxxxxxxxxxx

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