The charter for QIRG is talking about using quantum communication channels. The paper is talking about Shorr's work on error correction which is relevant to quantum cryptanalysis, an entirely different topic.
It is my understanding of the work on Quantum error correction that it is correcting errors in the measurement of quantum states rather than trying to compensate for decoherence so the base assumption of the paper seems to be off.
There are good reasons to build quantum computers, cryptanalysis ain't one of them. Not unless we can get a scalable approach like trapped ion to work. Building bigger and colder fridges is obviously a dead end. I really don't feel PKI as we know it is threatened at this point, but it is obviously something we need to keep a very watchful eye on because deploying new PKI systems has a twenty year time frame.
This is basic research and there is much from the Internet that may help inform that work. But it is still basic research.
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 8:30 AM Masataka Ohta <mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Let me initiate some *technical* discussion on practical impossibility
of quantum computing, here, because there is no WG in IETF for it.
QIRG is in IRTF and is chartered for, not against, quantum things.
As is discussed in:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ohta-qec-inapplicable-00
though quantum error correction by Shor assumes that, if an entangled
state is composed as superposition of (exponentially) many unentangled
terms, all the terms are *IDENTICALLY* disturbed by noise retaining
their relative coherence, which is obviously impossible. They are
actually disturbed *DIFFERENTLY*, correction of which is, obviously,
impossible with constant (not exponentially many, at all) number of
extra qubits.
As a result, quantum computing, relying on entangled states
with (exponentially) many unentangled terms, with practical
size is impossible and PKI is safe against quantum computers.
The draft is 5 pages long and requires mere elementary understanding
on entanglement.
Masataka Ohta