Re: [Last-Call] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-avtcore-cc-feedback-message-08

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Hi Michael,

> On 9 Sep 2020, at 09:22, Michael Scharf via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Reviewer: Michael Scharf
> Review result: Ready with Issues
> 
> This document has been reviewed as part of the transport area review team's
> ongoing effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written
> primarily for the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's
> authors and WG to allow them to address any issues raised and also to the IETF
> discussion list for information.
> 
> When done at the time of IETF Last Call, the authors should consider this
> review as part of the last-call comments they receive. Please always CC
> tsv-art@xxxxxxxx if you reply to or forward this review.
> 
> Major issues
> -------------
> 
> None
> 
> Minor issues
> -------------
> 
> 1/ Section 5:
> 
>   All RTP congestion control algorithms MUST specify how they
>   respond to the loss of feedback packets.
> 
> This is a process-related requirement not relevant for interoperability of
> implementations. In addition, the requirement is not very specific (What would
> have to be specified?). I am not sure if such a requirement in capital letters
> is really needed here. This should be handled consistently in all IETF
> documents.

Happy to change this to “need to specify”, but I also think “MUST” is appropriate. RTCP congestion control feedback packets can carry information about a larger number of data packets than is typical for, e.g., TCP ACKs, so it might be considered more critical that response to loss of feedback is defined.

> 2/ Section 11:
> 
> The Security Considerations do not discuss off-path attacks, and it is not
> clear why this case is missing. Can an off-path attacker trick the sender into
> sending at either an excessively high or excessively low rate?

An off-path attacker can’t modify RTCP congestion control feedback, but they could potentially spoof such packets. The fix is the same: use Secure RTP to authenticate. Will clarify.

> Nits
> ----
> 
> 1/ Abstract:
> 
> The protocol extension enables fine-grained feedback on per-packet reception
> quality. The rationale is provided in Section 1 and (more comprehensively) in
> Section 8. Yet, I wonder if this objective could also be made a bit more
> explicit in the abstract, e.g., along the lines of the "fine-grained feedback"
> wording in the first paragraph of Section 8.

Sure, seems reasonable.

> 2/ Section 7:
> 
> Typo in "a=ecn-capaable-rtp:”

Will fix.



-- 
Colin Perkins
https://csperkins.org/




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