Lorenzo Colitti wrote on 10/09/2020 12:26:
1. I think it should not include section 3.3.2. The reason is that it needlessly suggests an algorithm that is much more complex than simply using an existing random number generator which all nodes likely already have.
in theory you're probably right. In practice, some vendors take serious short-cuts when it comes to prngs, particularly in the bulk-produced, low-cost device market. This will particularly be an issue for IoT and on wifi where DAD's single-shot approach is intolerant of loss.
3.3.2 only ensures that extra entropy is injected. This probably isn't a bad thing.
Also the algorithm is based on rfc7217, so if there's a problem with this approach then that's possibly a wider discussion.
2. I think the text mentioning shorter IID lengths (3.3.1 bullet #2) is not useful to implementers, because all it says is that it is possible to implement a behaviour that for in all practical cases is forbidden by RFC 4291.
It refers non-normatively to 7421, which provides a useful and nuanced discussion of the issue. There doesn't seem to be any particular ambiguity here?
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