"Robert G. Brown" wrote: > a) All hosts must resolve with DNS. If you list why this isn't used today perhaps you will change "must" to "may". > b) All hosts must support an encryption key registered with DNS that > permits all message hops to occur between registered hosts encrypted > with the destination host public key. Mail privacy can only be guaranteed with an end-to-end encryption. Securing email in message hops does nothing to prevent monitoring at each host in the hop -- with some hosts not even advertised in the header. > c) The header autogenerate a postmaster-recursive email address for > reporting abuse to the entire delivery path. This would put a rather > large burden on the main network backbone administrators -- they'd need > automated tools to help handle it. OTOH, it would REALLY give them an > incentive to shut down networks that are a primary source of abuse until > they manage to police themselves. This would create a huge liability for the backbone administrators -- for example, one false abuse report and they could be sued for disrupting lawful communications. Human supervision actually increases the liability -- it can't be blamed on a software glitch. > d) With keyed host registration, tools that can QUICKLY isolate an > originating host and bop its (ab)user (minimally get them off the > network, ideally "instantly" fine them or charge them money such as a > reconnection fee AFTER getting them off the network). Machines running amok, quickly killing off other machines without recourse, without explanation. A kangaroo court for email, penalizing the users. > This would give > end users a strong incentive to police their own systems against viruses > and would give spammers additional costs to pay or additional charges to > be brought against them, should they try to skip out. Again, what you propose is to penalize the victim -- the user. That's exactly what we should stop doing. > I personally would ALSO like it if AV vendors STOPPED bounce messages > altogether. Free speech, good luck.