I understand you try to add CPU cycles into sending mail, by obliging people that send to many recipients to encrypt all e-mails... But I guess computer power is cheap... However that is an idea worth developing.Dean Anderson wrote: > On 10 Feb 2004, Franck Martin wrote: > ... > When you realign your anti-spam efforts from control of business to > control of techno-terrorists, the problem is quite a bit different, and > you can see also that things like signing and other things aren't going to > work. Signing doesn't work because it cannot provide a load per recipient, just per sender. Encryption with the recipient's public-key (as I am proposing) works because the spammer must encrypt each message for each recipient. This applies to lawful spammers as well, finally adding friction to email by creating a mandatory "fee" (burdenwise) to send messages.
What I suggest is to esig mails to list to ensure traceability would be spammers or people whose machine has been taken over. As somoene noted previously esig just ensure that the e-mail and private key met at some place. It does not mean a user intervention.
I see however the signing of e-mail, to provide traceability, so people can be located. Most SPAMMERS (legit or not) will think twice if they know they can be prosecuted... Think about Caller ID for telephones...
Moreover somebody will set a site of bad digital signature, so your mail system may reject all e-mails coming from these bad signatures...
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---- Franck Martin franck@xxxxxxxxx SOPAC, Fiji GPG Key fingerprint = 44A4 8AE4 392A 3B92 FDF9 D9C6 BE79 9E60 81D9 1320 "Toute connaissance est une reponse a une question" G.Bachelard |
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