Thanks for your review, Robert. I'm working on addressing the review comments received and wanted to have a clarifying discussion on some of yours before deciding what corresponding edits to make.
I think there's a misunderstanding about "jti" values and the security model. Because communication is over a TLS-protected channel between two parties, it would be fine if the JTI values were totally guessable, such as "A", "B", "C", etc. There's no opportunity for an attacker to inject traffic into or to listen to the stream. Does that make sense to you?
As for limits on how long a transmitter is required to hold a SET, I propose to add this text:
Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs under deployment-specific conditions,
such as if they have not been polled for over too long a period of time
or if an excessive amount of storage is needed to retain them.
-- Mike
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From: Id-event <id-event-bounces@xxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Robert Sparks via Datatracker
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 11:57 AM
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Cc: last-call@xxxxxxxx; draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll.all@xxxxxxxx; id-event@xxxxxxxx
Subject: [Id-event] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-09
Reviewer: Robert Sparks
Review result: Ready with Issues
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments.
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Document: draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-09
Reviewer: Robert Sparks
Review Date: 2020-05-08
IETF LC End Date: 2020-05-13
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
Summary: Essentially ready but with some issues to consider before publishing as a Proposed Standard RFC
This document is well-written and easy to follow.
I have a couple of edge-case issues that I think should be considered though:
This document allows, and anticipates, deployments where Recipients are not well authenticated. See, for example, the first sentence of section 4.1. There is also an unstated expectation in the document that the jti of each SET is hard to guess. If it's reasonably easy to guess jti values, a malicious Recipient could ack SETs it has never received and the Transmitter will remove that state, preventing a valid Recipient from ever receiving that SET.
If that's an explicit requirement in the jwt or SET base documents for the jti to be hard to guess, please point me to it? If there's not, perhaps a short discussion in the security considerations requiring this property would be worthwhile?
Is there a discussion somewhere of how long the transmitter is required to hold a given SET for a Recipient? Forever seems unreasonable.
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