Rifaat,
Thanks for your reading of the document.
The security section has a paragraph that begins:
"""
An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could
include an option from this document to force users to contact an
address of his choosing. As an attacker with this capability could
simply list himself as the default gateway (and so intercept all the
victim's traffic); this does not provide them with significantly more
capabilities, but because this document removes the need for
interception, the attacker may have an easier time performing the
attack....
include an option from this document to force users to contact an
address of his choosing. As an attacker with this capability could
simply list himself as the default gateway (and so intercept all the
victim's traffic); this does not provide them with significantly more
capabilities, but because this document removes the need for
interception, the attacker may have an easier time performing the
attack....
"""
Do you have any specific ideas for what text might be added to clarify vis. your concern? Would a sentence that captures your "the use of TLS and presenting the identity in the certificate might not be of much help" observation suffice?
Thanks,
-Erik
On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 05:10, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Reviewer: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Review result: Has Issues
Since the use of IP address literal is not forbidden by this document, what if
an attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs uses this option
to force the user to contact an IP address of his choosing? In this case, the use
of TLS and presenting the identity in the certificate might not be of much help.
I think this case should be discussed in the security consideration section..
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