On 10 Dec 2003, at 19:04, Franck Martin wrote:
Yes it is problem 2)
and yes I realise it is difficult to solve. This is why I suggested a new RFC...
Oh, maybe I misread. I thought you were talking about packets from bogus source addresses.
Numerous ASes support a blackhole community attribute which can be used to null-route customer traffic in the upstream. It's commonly used to stop denial-of-service traffic hitting the billable circuit, but it would work in this application too.
If supported by your provider, you could aggregate your unused space into a set of prefixes and advertise them to your provider with the corresponding community string attribute attached; traffic destined for those nets would be blackholed before they crossed the Pacific.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-turk-bgp-dos-04.txt
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/working-groups/routing-discussion/ current/msg00688.html
Joe