On Wed, 10 Sep 2003, Shelby Moore wrote: > At 01:41 PM 9/9/2003 -0400, you wrote: > > However, I think the analysis of the concepts of information theory, > channels, and models of spam is more fundamental to "internet > engineering" than the original purpose of this thread and thus I see no > reason why it would not be useful data here at IETF. I tend to think that the more theoretical aspects of abuse-free protocols aren't specific to spam, and are probably of more general interest. However, discussion needs to be productive, as well as interesting. > Before I respond to your continuance of your argument, I *respectfully* > remind that I already refuted the whole line of criticism you are > continuing in this post, when I rebutted your last post in this thread: I did read your post. But it seems we have unbridgeable differences: > but to focus your attention on detection, rather than protocol > alteration. It is impossible to alter the protocol in any way that > will force the spammer to identify themselves a-priori as a spammer. Disagree strongly. First benefit is once you define spam == *BE (instead of UBE), then it is easier to model spam and do research on it,because you can model it at any node in the channel, not only at the receiver end point. That was my whole point about "enforcers". I think I've already covered this, but perhaps more clarity will be helpful: The theoretical definition of "spam" is simply "email that is unintended by the the system operator, that is hidden from the system operator, and violates the security policy of the system operator". No more precision is necessary to use the theoretical framework I am using. We don't need the exact intentions of the system operator, nor the security policy. We just have to posit that these exist, and that they are violated by spam. For example, altering the definition of spam doen't have any effect on the impossibility of making a protocol that will automatically force the spammer (uncooperatively) to distingish themselves from regular users (self marking). Self-marking could only be done with the spammers cooperation, and there is no reason to think that todays abusers will cooperate, since most of those abusers are already unconvicted felons and have no commercial purposes. Frequently, these abusers appear to use viruses, which could be using the credentials of regular users. So, they can do _everything_ those regular users can do. Because you can't count on any quick cooperation before the recipients mailbox, it doesn't seem to be helpful to think about modeling spam at other nodes. --Dean