I'd like propose a theory reguarding the success of the junk fax law which would provide a reason that similar laws reguarding junk email might not be successful: There are significant costs associated with the origination of junk faxes in the the sender must tie up a phone line for the duration of the transmission and in many/most cases will be originating the fax from a commercial measured rate phone so that even local calls will cost real money. A wide area junk fax transmission would include long distance costs or many remote offices. On that basis, my theory is that the junk fax law, with the potential for fines, etc., tipped the economics for the sender sufficiently that the problem was resolved. Junk email on the other hand has an extremely low cost of transmission in the current economic model. Adding laws which establish penalties for sending junk email will probably send the offenders outside of the reach of the enforcement authorities. In the US, we already have major corporations moving shell headquarters offshore to friendly taxing authorities to avoid MAJOR tax bills and can't even fix the problem when there are serious economic consequences to the government. Based on that example and many others, I have no faith that enforcement based penalties will make a significant difference because the perceived change to the economics will be minimal. Dave Morris