A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
Title : Requirements for Message Access Control
Authors : Trevor Freeman
Jim Schaad
Patrick Patterson
Filename : draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-11.txt
Pages : 49
Date : 2015-03-08
Abstract:
S/MIME delivers confidentiality, integrity, and data origination
authentication for email. However, there are many situations where
organizations also want robust access control applied to information
in messages. The Enhanced Security Services (ESS) RFC5035 for S/MIME
defines an access control mechanism for email, but the access check
happens after the data is decrypted by the recipient which devalues
the protection afforded by the cryptography and provides very weak
guarantees of policy compliance. Another major issues for S/MIME is
its dependency on a single type of identity credential, an X.509
certificate. Many users on the Internet today do not have X.509
certificates and therefore cannot use S/MIME. Furthermore, the
requirement to discover the X.509 certificate for every recipient of
an encrypted message by the sender has proven to be an unreliable
process for a number of reasons.
This document presents requirements for an alternative model to ESS to
address the identified issues with access control in order to deliver
more robust compliance for S/MIME protected messages. This document
describes an access control model which uses cryptographic keys to
enforce access control policy decisions where the policy check is
performed prior to the decryption of the message contents. This
authorization model can be instantiated using many existing standards
and is in not intended to be a one off just for email, being
applicable to other data types.
This document also presents requirements for the abstraction of the
specifics of the authentication technologies used by S/MIME users. The
abstraction makes it possible for other forms of authentication
credentials to be used with S/MIME thereby enabling much broader
adoption. The authentication abstraction model also removes the
dependency on the need to discover encryption keys by the sender. This
abstraction can be used independently from access control to enable
simple scenarios where authentication of the recipient is sufficient
to grant access to the message.
The name Plasma was assigned to this effort as part of the IETF
process. It is derived from PoLicy enhAnced Secure eMAil.
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements/
There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-11
A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-11
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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