The IESG has approved the following document: - 'DHCP Options for the Port Control Protocol (PCP)' (draft-ietf-pcp-dhcp-13.txt) as Proposed Standard This document is the product of the Port Control Protocol Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Ted Lemon and Brian Haberman. A URL of this Internet Draft is: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-dhcp/ Technical Summary: This document specifies DHCP (IPv4 and IPv6) options to configure hosts with Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server IP addresses. The use of DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 depends on the PCP deployment scenario. Working Group Summary: There was controversy around the use of IP address vs hostnames vs strings passed to getaddrinfo (which could be hostname or IP literal). The WG eventually achieved rough consensus on the IP address mechanism recommended by Ted Lemon, referencing [I-D.ietf-dhc-topo-conf] informatively for discussion on how various scenarios can still be solved using that mechanism. Document Quality: One implementation is documented at http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat64-experiments-00#section-2.9 Other implementations are expected. Ted Lemon performed DHCP review and raised issues with the previous approach (strings passed to getaddrinfo). A significant discussion ensued which resulted in Ted authoring draft-ietf-dhc-topo-conf for WGs and documents to reference. That document was presented to the PCP WG, which then got consensus on the final approach (IP addresses, and referencing that draft for discussion of operational guidance). Personnel: Dave Thaler is the Document Shepherd. Ted Lemon is the Responsible Area Director. RFC Editor Note: In section 8, please make the following change: OLD: The PCP Server option targets mainly the simple threat model (Section 18.1 of [RFC6887]). It is out of scope of this document to discuss potential implications of the use of this option in the advanced threat model (Section 18.2 of [RFC6887]). NEW: The PCP server option defined here is applicable when operating under the simple threat model (Section 18.1 of [RFC6887]). Operation under the advanced threat model (section 18.2 of [RFC6887]) may or may not be appropriate; analysis of this question is out of scope for this document.
