The IESG has no problem with the publication of 'Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote' <draft-keromytis-tls-authz-keynote-07.txt> as an Informational RFC. The IESG would also like the RFC-Editor to review the comments in the datatracker (https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=17180&rfc_flag=0) related to this document and determine whether or not they merit incorporation into the document. Comments may exist in both the ballot and the comment log. The IESG contact person is Tim Polk. A URL of this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-keromytis-tls-authz-keynote-07.txt The process for such documents is described at http://www.rfc-editor.org/indsubs.html. Thank you, The IESG Secretary Technical Summary This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to [AUTHZ]. Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. Then, if supported by both the client and the server, KeyNote credentials are exchanged during the supplemental data handshake message. Working Group Summary This document is an independent submission. Document Quality While there is no existing implementations of the protocol, implementation should be straightforward with appropriate TLS toolkits. Future versions of the keynote distribution are expected to include any necessary functionality to encode and decode the required data structures. Personnel Tim Polk reviewed this document for the IESG. RFC Editor Note Proposed response to the RFC Editor 1. The IESG has concluded that there is no conflict between this document and IETF work. _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list IETF-Announce@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce