The IESG has approved the following document: - 'Kerberos Cryptosystem Negotiation Extension ' <draft-zhu-kerb-enctype-nego-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard This document is the product of the Kerberos WG Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Sam Hartman and Russ Housley. A URL of this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-zhu-kerb-enctype-nego-04.txt Technical Summary This document specifies an extension to the Kerberos protocol where the client can send a list of supported encryption types in decreasing preference order, and the server then selects an encryption type that is supported by both the client and the server. This extension is useful in cases where the client and server support an encryption type that the KDC does not support; existing mechanisms handle the case where the KDC supports the encryption type. Working Group Summary This document represents the consensus of the Kerberos Working Group. Protocol Quality At least one implementor has implemented this specification. This document was reviewed for the IESG by Jeffrey Hutzelman and Sam Hartman. Note to RFC Editor Please make the following changes: In the Abstract: OLD: This document specifies an extension to the Kerberos protocol where the client can send a list of supported encryption types in decreasing preference order, and the server then selects an encryption type that is supported by both the client and the server. NEW: This document specifies an extension to the Kerberos protocol as defined in RFC4120, in which the client can send a list of supported encryption types in decreasing preference order, and the server then selects an encryption type that is supported by both the client and the server. At the beginning of section 1: OLD: Under the current mechanism [RFC4120], the KDC must limit the ticket session key encryption type (enctype) chosen for a given server to one it believes is supported by both the client and the server. NEW: Under the current mechanism [RFC4120], the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) must limit the ticket session key encryption type (enctype) chosen for a given server to one it believes is supported by both the client and the server. _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
