The IESG has received a request from the Using TLS in Applications WG (uta) to consider the following document: - 'SMTP Require TLS Option' <draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-07.txt> as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-02-08. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security standpoint as it might be because of its opportunistic nature; message delivery is, by default, prioritized over security. This document describes an SMTP service extension, REQUIRETLS, and message header field, RequireTLS. If the REQUIRETLS option or RequireTLS message header field is used when sending a message, it asserts a request on the part of the message sender to override the default negotiation of TLS, either by requiring that TLS be negotiated when the message is relayed, or by requesting that recipient-side policy mechanisms such as MTA-STS and DANE be ignored when relaying a message for which security is unimportant. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
