Published: February 4, 2021 Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2020-2/ Vulnerability A vulnerability was discovered in how wpa_supplicant processing P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) group information from active group owners. The actual parsing of that information validates field lengths appropriately, but processing of the parsed information misses a length check when storing a copy of the secondary device types. This can result in writing attacker controlled data into the peer entry after the area assigned for the secondary device type. The overflow can result in corrupting pointers for heap allocations. This can result in an attacker within radio range of the device running P2P discovery being able to cause unexpected behavior, including termination of the wpa_supplicant process and potentially arbitrary code execution. Vulnerable versions/configurations wpa_supplicant v1.0-v2.9 with CONFIG_P2P build option enabled An attacker (or a system controlled by the attacker) needs to be within radio range of the vulnerable system to send a suitably constructed management frame that triggers a P2P peer device information to be created or updated. Acknowledgments This issue was discovered by fuzz testing of wpa_supplicant by Google's OSS-Fuzz. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commit to wpa_supplicant and rebuild it: P2P: Fix copying of secondary device types for P2P group client This patch is available from https://w1.fi/security/2020-2/ - Update to wpa_supplicant v2.10 or newer, once available - Disable P2P (control interface command "P2P_SET disabled 1" or "p2p_disabled=1" in (each, if multiple interfaces used) wpa_supplicant configuration file) - Disable P2P from the build (remove CONFIG_P2P=y) -- Jouni Malinen PGP id EFC895FA _______________________________________________ Hostap mailing list Hostap@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/hostap
