Re: [RFC] Disable TLSv1.0 by default, but allow enabling it

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On 05/12/2018 00:09, Jouni Malinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 01:00:08PM +0100, Andrej Shadura wrote:
>> This patch is not intended to be merged into the upstream code, but I
>> would still like to receive comments from people involved in development.
>>
>> In the Debian bug reports #907518 and #911297 (see below), people complained
>> that OpenSSL 1.1.1 disables TLSv1.0 and some other insecure settings by
>> default, but some older networks may still require their support:
> 
> This is going to break lots of WLAN connections in practice..
> Unfortunately, enterprise authentication servers are something that do
> not really get updated easily and when something is updated, things
> tends to break horribly.. For that to change, I guess there would need
> to be a change in significant number of client devices (or something
> very widely used device) to start rejecting the connections with a clear
> message indicating that the issue is in the server and not something
> that the client device can fix on its own.
> 
> In practice, though, wpa_supplicant may have to start overriding this
> type of system-wide enforcement to prevent cases where the user has no
> way of impact the authentication server operator, so something may need
> to be merged into hostap.git to get more reasonable behavior than "not
> working until server is updated (which may never happen)".
> 
> It should also be noted that use of TLS in EAP is quite different from
> other cases like HTTPS, i.e., EAP uses very limited amount of
> application data (or even none of it in case of EAP-TLS), so the impact
> of various TLS issues with past versions may be different as well. There
> are some clear cases like not allowing too short DH keys to be used
> which can certainly be justified from security view point, but fully
> disabling TLS v1.0 by default may not be something that EAP world is
> ready for yet.. Some ciphers might also be possible to disable without
> losing too much interoperability with currently deployed authentication
> servers.

Right, so what would you recommend for me to do in the meanwhile?
Hardcode a minimal version just for wpa-supplicant to TLSv1.0? What
about ciphers? Anything else?

-- 
Cheers,
  Andrej

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