On Mon, Apr 28, 2008 at 06:29:07PM +0200, Henrik Austad wrote: > > As discussed in [1], SHA-1 is not as secure as it once was (and this was in > 2005), and I'm wondering - are there any plans for migrating to another > hash-algorithm? I.e. SHA-2, whirlpool.. SHA-1 is broken in the sense that it requires computation less than finding a collision by brute force (2^80). It is still very costly and AFAIK no one yet has found a single collision for SHA-1 yet, but even if such a collision is found, the question is how it can be exploit? This collision cannot be used to replace any existing code in Git. The only way to exploit this collision is to submit a patch based on one sequence to the maintainer and it should look legitimate to be accepted and then create another blob with malicious code based on the other sequence, so the second blob has the same SHA-1 then anyone who pulls from you will get malicious code. However, it is tricky to create these two blobs -- one which should pass inspection and look like as a real improvement but the other one that should do what you want. All what you have is two sequences of 20 bytes with the same SHA-1 and you have no control over them. For some binary files, it is possible by including both good and bad contents in the submitted blob and using one sequence in the right place to hide the bad part and make only the good one active/visible. Then the other blob will be almost the same but contains the other sequence, which is used to activate the bad part. This can work if the maintainer cannot see everything but only the "visible" part. However, I don't think you can do anything like that with _source_ code, which is inspect. And if submitted code is not reviewed, there is nothing that can protect you from malicious code getting into the repository (and even worse it will get directly into the official repository!). So, I don't think we have to worry much about possibility a collision attack, but only about preimage attacks; and a preimage attack on SHA-1 is far away from reality. Dmitry -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe git" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html