Re: Git remote origin leaks user access token

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(+cc: git@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, git-security -> bcc)
Hi!

limin wrote:

> Hi, I found a potential security issue when running a tool in my private
> project. I think this exposes my personal access token to danger when using
> "git remote get-url origin".

I'm moving this conversation to the public Git mailing list, as this
behavior is well known.

I look forward to working together on ways to reduce the impact (for
example, ways to encourage people to use their system's password
keychain instead of including credentials in URLs).

Report left unsnipped below, for reference.

Thanks,
Jonathan

> Version
>
> 2.45.2
>
> Description
>
> Lots of people are using personal access token to clone their private
> repository. To use a access token, you can include your username and token
> in https url to clone projects on github, gitlab or any other DevOps
> Platform:
>
> git clone https://<username>:<token>@github.com/username/repository.git
>
> However, we can get the token back easily by just using git remote get-url
> origin.
>
> cd privateProject
> git remote get-url origin
> > https://username:ghp_xxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx/username/repository.git
>
> This can be dangerous, because we often run third party tools in our
> private repository. If a malicious tool runs git remote get-url origin, it
> can steal our personal access token of github/gitlab. In this case, our
> github/gitlab will be controlled by attackers which can have severe
> consequences.
>
> I found this issue during code auditing via safety tool
> <https://github.com/pyupio/safety>. After scanning a project using safety
> check -r requirements.txt --save-json test.json, safety saved results into
> test.json file. However, when I looked into test.json, I found my personal
> access token in this file.
>
> "report_meta": {
>     "scan_target": "files",
>     "scanned": [
>         "/home/kali/huntr/azure-sdk-for-python/tools/azure-sdk-tools/ci_tools/versioning/requirements.txt"
>     ],
>     "target_languages": [
>         "python"
>     ],
>     "git": {
>         "branch": "main",
>         "tag": "",
>         "commit": "b182b0c4f9d07d18f118130bc941c3b7a75667b1",
>         "dirty": false,
>         "origin": "https://outh2:ghp_xxxx@xxxxxxxxxx/sunriseXu/xxxx.git";
>     },
> }
>
> So, I looked into the source code of safety. The class GIT
> <https://github.com/pyupio/safety/blob/f15d7908d27fd887dcc6b31237b8e3df79a9359b/safety/scan/util.py#L49>
> is
> responsible for collecting repository information in current repo where
> safety runs.
>
> class GIT:
>     ORIGIN_CMD: Tuple[str, ...] = ("remote", "get-url", "origin")
>     def __run__(self, cmd: Tuple[str, ...], env_var: Optional[str] =
> None) -> Optional[str]:
>         if env_var and os.environ.get(env_var):
>             return os.environ.get(env_var)
>
>         try:
>             return subprocess.run(self.git + cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
>
> stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).stdout.decode('utf-8').strip()
>         except Exception as e:
>             LOG.exception(e)
>
>         return None
>     def origin(self) -> Optional[str]:
>         # get the origin of repository
>         return self.__run__(self.ORIGIN_CMD, env_var="SAFETY_GIT_ORIGIN")
>
> Impact
>
> This can have severe consequences. *Any* tools running in private
> repositories have ability to steal personal access token if the token is
> written in git remote url explicitly. Git should mask user’s access token
> when using cli command git remote get-url origin.




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