From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@xxxxxx> As part of the protections added in Git v2.45.1 and friends, repository-local `core.hooksPath` settings are no longer allowed, as a defense-in-depth mechanism to prevent future Git vulnerabilities to raise to critical level if those vulnerabilities inadvertently allow the repository-local config to be written. What the added protection did not anticipate is that such a repository-local `core.hooksPath` can not only be used to point to maliciously-placed scripts in the current worktree, but also to _prevent_ hooks from being called altogether. We just reverted the `core.hooksPath` protections, based on the Git maintainer's recommendation in https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqq4jaxvm8z.fsf@gitster.g/ to address this concern as well as related ones. Let's make sure that we won't regress while trying to protect the clone operation further. Reported-by: Brooke Kuhlmann <brooke@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@xxxxxx> --- t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh index f6dc83e2aab..1eae346a6e3 100755 --- a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh +++ b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh @@ -41,4 +41,8 @@ test_expect_success 'git rev-parse --git-path hooks' ' test .git/custom-hooks/abc = "$(cat actual)" ' +test_expect_success 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null' ' + git clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null . no-templates +' + test_done -- gitgitgadget
