Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] reftable/stack: refactor reloading to use file descriptor

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On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 11:06:43AM +0100, Patrick Steinhardt wrote:

> We're about to introduce a stat(3P)-based caching mechanism to reload
> the list of stacks only when it has changed. In order to avoid race
> conditions this requires us to have a file descriptor available that we
> can use to call fstat(3P) on.
> 
> Prepare for this by converting the code to use `fd_read_lines()` so that
> we have the file descriptor readily available.

Coverity noted a case with this series where we might feed a negative
value to fstat(). I'm not sure if it's a bug or not.

The issue is that here:

> @@ -329,9 +330,19 @@ static int reftable_stack_reload_maybe_reuse(struct reftable_stack *st,
>  		if (tries > 3 && tv_cmp(&now, &deadline) >= 0)
>  			goto out;
>  
> -		err = read_lines(st->list_file, &names);
> -		if (err < 0)
> -			goto out;
> +		fd = open(st->list_file, O_RDONLY);
> +		if (fd < 0) {
> +			if (errno != ENOENT) {
> +				err = REFTABLE_IO_ERROR;
> +				goto out;
> +			}
> +
> +			names = reftable_calloc(sizeof(char *));
> +		} else {
> +			err = fd_read_lines(fd, &names);
> +			if (err < 0)
> +				goto out;
> +		}

...we might end up with fd as "-1" after calling open() on the list
file. For most errors we'll jump to "out", which makes sense. But if we
get ENOENT, we keep going with an empty file-list, which makes sense.

But we then do other stuff with "fd". I think this case is OK:

> @@ -356,12 +367,16 @@ static int reftable_stack_reload_maybe_reuse(struct reftable_stack *st,
>  		names = NULL;
>  		free_names(names_after);
>  		names_after = NULL;
> +		close(fd);
> +		fd = -1;

We only get here if reftable_stack_reload_once() returned an error,
which it won't do since we feed it a blank set of names (and anyway,
close(-1) is a harmless noop).

But if we actually get to the end of the function, it's more
questionable. As of this patch, it's OK:

>  		delay = delay + (delay * rand()) / RAND_MAX + 1;
>  		sleep_millisec(delay);
>  	}
>  
>  out:
> +	if (fd >= 0)
> +		close(fd);
>  	free_names(names);
>  	free_names(names_after);
>  	return err;

But in the next patch we have this hunk:

> @@ -374,7 +375,11 @@ static int reftable_stack_reload_maybe_reuse(struct reftable_stack *st,
>                 sleep_millisec(delay);
>         }
> 
> +       stat_validity_update(&st->list_validity, fd);
> +
>  out:
> +       if (err)
> +               stat_validity_clear(&st->list_validity);
>         if (fd >= 0)
>                 close(fd);
>         free_names(names);

which means we'll feed a negative value to stat_validity_update(). I
think this may be OK, because I'd imagine the only sensible thing to do
is call stat_validity_clear() instead. And using a negative fd means
fstat() will fail, which will cause stat_validity_update() to clear the
validity struct anyway. But I thought it was worth double-checking.

-Peff




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