Re: Limited operations in unsafe repositories

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On 2024-01-10 at 12:05:31, Jeff King wrote:
> My thinking is to flip that around: run all code, but put protection in
> the spots that do unsafe things, like loading config or examining
> hooks. I.e., a patch like this:

I think that's much what I had intended to do with not invoking binaries
at all, except that it was limited to rev-parse.  I wonder if perhaps we
could do something similar if we had the `--assume-unsafe` argument you
proposed, except that we would only allow the `git` binary and always
pass that argument to it in such a case.

I don't think reading config is intrinsically unsafe; it's more of what
we do with it, which is spawning external processes, that's the problem.
I suppose an argument could be made for injecting terminal sequences or
such, though.  Hooks, obviously, are definitely unsafe.
-- 
brian m. carlson (he/him or they/them)
Toronto, Ontario, CA

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