Re: [PATCH] mailinfo: fix out-of-bounds memory reads in unquote_quoted_pair()

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On Wed, Dec 13, 2023 at 03:20:27AM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 13, 2023 at 08:07:21AM +0100, Patrick Steinhardt wrote:
[snip]
> > Another thing I was wondering about is the recursive nature of these
> > functions, and whether it can lead to similar issues like we recently
> > had when parsing revisions with stack exhaustion. I _think_ this should
> > not be much of a problem in this case though, as we're talking about
> > mail headers here. While the length of header values isn't restricted
> > per se (the line length is restricted to 1000, but with Comment Folding
> > Whitespace values can span multiple lines), but mail provdiers will sure
> > clamp down on mails with a "From:" header that is megabytes in size.
> 
> It's just unquote_comment() that is recursive, but yeah, there is
> nothing to stop it from recursing forever on "((((((...". The stack
> requirements are pretty small, though. I needed between 2^17 and 2^18
> bytes to segfault on my machine using:
> 
>   perl -e 'print "From: ", "(" x 2**18;' |
>   git mailinfo /dev/null /dev/null
> 
> Absurdly big for an email, but maybe within the realm of possibility? I
> think it might be possible to drop the recursion and just use a depth
> counter, like this:

It's definitely not as large as I'd have expected it to be, we're only
talking about kilobytes of data. Feels like it might be in the realm of
possibility to get transferred by a mail provider.

> diff --git a/mailinfo.c b/mailinfo.c
> index 737b9e5e13..db236f9f9f 100644
> --- a/mailinfo.c
> +++ b/mailinfo.c
> @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static void parse_bogus_from(struct mailinfo *mi, const struct strbuf *line)
>  static const char *unquote_comment(struct strbuf *outbuf, const char *in)
>  {
>  	int take_next_literally = 0;
> +	int depth = 1;
>  
>  	strbuf_addch(outbuf, '(');
>  
> @@ -72,11 +73,14 @@ static const char *unquote_comment(struct strbuf *outbuf, const char *in)
>  				take_next_literally = 1;
>  				continue;
>  			case '(':
> -				in = unquote_comment(outbuf, in);
> +				strbuf_addch(outbuf, '(');
> +				depth++;
>  				continue;
>  			case ')':
>  				strbuf_addch(outbuf, ')');
> -				return in;
> +				if (!--depth)
> +					return in;
> +				continue;
>  			}
>  		}
>  
> I doubt it's a big deal either way, but if it's that easy to do it might
> be worth it.

Isn't this only protecting against unbalanced braces? That might be a
sensible check to do regardless, but does it protect against recursion
blowing the stack if you just happen to have many opening braces?

Might be I'm missing something.

Patrick

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