Re: [PATCH 02/20] packfile.c: prevent overflow in `load_idx()`

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Hi Taylor

On 13/07/2023 00:37, Taylor Blau wrote:
Prevent an overflow when locating a pack's CRC offset when the number
of packed items is greater than 2^32-1/hashsz by guarding the
computation with an `st_mult()`.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
  packfile.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/packfile.c b/packfile.c
index 89220f0e03..70acf1694b 100644
--- a/packfile.c
+++ b/packfile.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int load_idx(const char *path, const unsigned int hashsz, void *idx_map,
  		     */
  		    (sizeof(off_t) <= 4))
  			return error("pack too large for current definition of off_t in %s", path);
-		p->crc_offset = 8 + 4 * 256 + nr * hashsz;
+		p->crc_offset = st_add(8 + 4 * 256, st_mult(nr, hashsz));

p->crc_offset is a uint32_t so we're still prone to truncation here unless we change the crc_offset member of struct packed_git to be a size_t. I haven't checked if the other users of crc_offset would need adjusting if we change its type.

Best Wishes

Phillip

  	}
p->index_version = version;



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