Re: Is GIT_DEFAULT_HASH flawed?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, May 08, 2023 at 09:38:56PM +0000, brian m. carlson wrote:
On 2023-05-08 at 02:00:56, Felipe Contreras wrote:
brian m. carlson wrote:
> On 2023-05-02 at 23:46:02, Felipe Contreras wrote:
> > In my view one repository should be able to have part SHA-1 history,
> > part SHA3-256 history, and part BLAKE2b history.
> > That is practically very difficult and it means that it's hard to have
> confidence in the later history because SHA-1 is weak and you have to
> rely on it to verify the SHA-256 history later.

Why would I have to rely on SHA-1 to verify the SHA-256 history later
on?

If your history contains mixed and matched hash algorithms, you'll need
to be able to verify those commits to the root to have any confidence in
a signed commit or tag, which means trusting SHA-1 if you have any SHA-1
commits in the repository.

the history is traversed from the end anyway, so having sha-1 in the history is entirely irrelevant for verifying sha-256 commits, assuming one may only upgrade the algorithm.

the transition plan implies the intent to ultimately get rid of old algos, but this is a non-starter, because old histories need to remain accessible indefinitely (you can't rewrite all external references, and even for in-history references this would be unreliable and would falsify historical builds).

i won't try making an argument for mixed histories, as i'm assuming i wouldn't add anything that hasn't already been written.

-- ossi



[Index of Archives]     [Linux Kernel Development]     [Gcc Help]     [IETF Annouce]     [DCCP]     [Netdev]     [Networking]     [Security]     [V4L]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux Security]     [Linux RAID]     [Linux SCSI]     [Fedora Users]

  Powered by Linux