Re: Question: What's the best way to implement directory permission control in git?

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On Thu, Jul 28 2022, ZheNing Hu wrote:

> Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@xxxxxxxxx> 于2022年7月27日周三 17:20写道:
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 27 2022, ZheNing Hu wrote:
>>
>> > if there is a monorepo such as
>> > git@xxxxxxxxxx:derrickstolee/sparse-checkout-example.git
>> >
>> > There are many files and directories:
>> >
>> > client/
>> >     android/
>> >     electron/
>> >     iOS/
>> > service/
>> >     common/
>> >     identity/
>> >     list/
>> >     photos/
>> > web/
>> >     browser/
>> >     editor/
>> >     friends/
>> > boostrap.sh
>> > LICENSE.md
>> > README.md
>> >
>> > Now we can use partial-clone + sparse-checkout to reduce
>> > the network overhead, and reduce disk storage space size, that's good.
>> >
>> > But I also need a ACL to control what directory or file people can fetch/push.
>> > e.g. I don't want a client fetch the code in "service" or "web".
>> >
>> > Now if the user client use "git log -p" or "git sparse-checkout add service"...
>> > or other git command, git which will  download them by
>> > "git fetch --filter=blob:none --stdin <oid>" automatically.
>> >
>> > This means that the git client and server interact with git objects
>> > (and don't care about path) we cannot simply ban someone download
>> > a "path" on the server side.
>> >
>> > What should I do? You may recommend me to use submodule,
>> > but due to its complexity, I don't really want to use it :-(
>>
>> There isn't a way to do this in git.
>>
>> It's theoretically possible, i.e. a client could be told that the SHA-1
>> of a directory is XYZ, and construct a commit object with a reference to
>> it.
>>
>
> I guess you mean use a special reference to hold the restricted path which
> the client can access, and pre-receive-hook can ban the client from downloading
> other references. But this method is a little weird... How can this reference
> sync with main branches? If we have changed client permission to access
> server directory, how to get the "history" of the server directory?
>
> I believe this approach is not very appropriate and is not maintainable.

It's not maintainable at all, and I don't believe any current git client
supports this.

But due to git's commits referring to a Merkle tree I can tell you that
a subdirectory "secret" has a current tree SHA-1 of XYZ, without giving
you any of that content.

You *could* then manually construct a commit like:

	tree <NEW_TREE>
	...

Where the "<NEW_TREE>" would be a tree like:

	100644 blob <NEW-BLOB-SHA1>	UPDATED.md
	040000 tree <XYZ>	secret-stuff

And send you a PACK with my new two three new objects (commit, blob &
new top-level NEW_TREE). To the remote end & protocol it wouldn't be
distinguishable from a "normal" push.

But nothing supports this already, as a practical matter most of git
either hard dies if content is missing, or has other odd edge-case
semantics (and I'm not up-to-date on the state of the art).

Anyway, just saying that for the longer term I'm not aware of an
*intrinsic* reason for why we couldn't support this sort of thing, in
case anyone's interested in putting in a *lot* of leg work to make it
happen.

>> But currently a *lot* of things in the client code assume that these
>> things will be available in one way or another.
>>
>> The state-of-the-art in the "sparse" code may differ from the above, I
>> don't know.
>>
>> Also note that there's a well-known edge case in the git protocol where
>> it's really incompatible with the notion of "secret" data, i.e. even if
>> you hide a ref you'll be able to "guess" it by seeing what delta(s) the
>> server will produce or accept etc.
>
> Yeah, there are data security issues... Unless we need to isolate objects
> between directories. Or in this case we disable the delta object.....
> Okay, this seems a little strange.

You can't really just "disable the delta(s)". Well, you can in
principle, but like what I outlined above it's one of those things
that's a far way off, and it's one thing to e.g. have a client that's
able to craft a commit referring to data it doesn't have.

It's quite another to secure a server in such a way that it can serve up
secret data from the repo to some clients, but not to others.

I can imagine some hacks to make that happen, but I won't go into that
here...




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