Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Suggested-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/config/safe.txt | 5 +++--
git-compat-util.h | 15 ++++++++++-----
t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh | 15 +--------------
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/safe.txt b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
index c6ebd1674dd..3128b132713 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/safe.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@ As explained, Git only allows you to access repositories owned by
yourself, i.e. the user who is running Git, by default. When Git
is running as 'root' in a non Windows platform that provides sudo,
however, git checks the SUDO_UID environment variable that sudo creates
-and will allow access to the uid recorded as its value instead.
+and will allow access to the uid recorded as its value in addition to
+the id from 'root'.
This is to make it easy to perform a common sequence during installation
"make && sudo make install". A git process running under 'sudo' runs as
'root' but the 'sudo' command exports the environment variable to record
which id the original user has.
If that is not what you would prefer and want git to only trust
-repositories that are owned by root instead, then you must remove
+repositories that are owned by root instead, then you can remove
the `SUDO_UID` variable from root's environment before invoking git.
diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h
index e7cbfa65c9a..0a5a4ee7a9a 100644
--- a/git-compat-util.h
+++ b/git-compat-util.h
@@ -420,9 +420,10 @@ static inline int git_offset_1st_component(const char *path)
* maybe provide you with a patch that would prevent this issue again
* in the future.
*/
-static inline void extract_id_from_env(const char *env, uid_t *id)
+static inline int id_from_env_matches(const char *env, uid_t id)
{
const char *real_uid = getenv(env);
+ int matches = 0;
/* discard anything empty to avoid a more complex check below */
if (real_uid && *real_uid) {
@@ -432,9 +433,10 @@ static inline void extract_id_from_env(const char *env, uid_t *id)
errno = 0;
/* silent overflow errors could trigger a bug here */
env_id = strtoul(real_uid, &endptr, 10);
- if (!*endptr && !errno)
- *id = env_id;
+ if (!*endptr && !errno && (uid_t)env_id == id)
+ matches = 1;
}
+ return matches;
}
static inline int is_path_owned_by_current_uid(const char *path)
@@ -446,10 +448,13 @@ static inline int is_path_owned_by_current_uid(const char *path)
return 0;
euid = geteuid();
+ if (st.st_uid == euid)
+ return 1;
+
if (euid == ROOT_UID)
- extract_id_from_env("SUDO_UID", &euid);
+ return id_from_env_matches("SUDO_UID", st.st_uid);
- return st.st_uid == euid;
+ return 0;
}
#define is_path_owned_by_current_user is_path_owned_by_current_uid
diff --git a/t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh b/t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
index a621f1ea5eb..ff311761289 100755
--- a/t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
+++ b/t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ test_expect_success 'can access if addressed explicitly' '
)
'
-test_expect_failure SUDO 'can access with sudo if root' '
+test_expect_success SUDO 'can access with sudo if root' '
(
cd root/p &&
sudo git status
@@ -85,19 +85,6 @@ test_expect_success SUDO 'can access with sudo if root by removing SUDO_UID' '
)
'
-test_lazy_prereq SUDO_SUDO '
- sudo sudo id -u >u &&
- id -u root >r &&
- test_cmp u r
-'
-
-test_expect_success SUDO_SUDO 'can access with sudo abusing SUDO_UID' '
- (
- cd root/p &&
- sudo sudo git status
- )
-'
-
# this MUST be always the last test
test_expect_success SUDO 'cleanup' '
sudo rm -rf root
--
2.36.1.371.g0fb0ef0c8d
