From: Fabian Stelzer <fs@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
set gpg.format = ssh and user.signingkey to a ssh public key string (like from an
authorized_keys file) and commits/tags can be signed using the private
key from your ssh-agent.
Verification uses a allowed_signers_file (see ssh-keygen(1)) which
defaults to .gitsigners but can be set via gpg.ssh.allowedsigners
A possible gpg.ssh.revocationfile is also passed to ssh-keygen on
verification.
needs openssh>8.2p1
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
RFC: Add commit & tag signing/verification via SSH keys using ssh-keygen
Support for using private keyfiles directly is still missing and i'm
unsure on how to configure it or if the pubkey in the signingkey field
is such a good idea. A SSH Fingerprint as signingkey would be nicer, but
key lookup would be quite cumbersome. Maybe storing the fingerprint in
signingkey and then have a gpg.ssh.$FINGERPRINT.publickey/privatekeyfile
setting? As a default we could get the first ssh key from ssh-add and
store it in the config to avoid unintentional changes of the used
signing key. I've started with some tests for SSH Signing but having
static private keyfiles would make this a lot easier. So still on my
TODO.
This feature makes git signing much more accessible to the average user.
Usually they have a SSH Key for pushing code already. Using it for
signing commits allows us to verify not only the transport but the
pushed code as well. The allowed_signers file could be kept in the
repository if all receives are verified (allowing only useris with valid
signatures to add/change them) or outside if generated/managed
differently. Tools like gitolite could optionally generate and enforce
them from the already existing user ssh keys for example.
In our corporate environemnt we use PIV x509 Certs on Yubikeys for email
signing/encryption and ssh keys which i think is quite common (at least
for the email part). This way we can establish the correct trust for the
SSH Keys without setting up a separate GPG Infrastructure (which is
still quite painful for users) or implementing x509 signing support for
git (which lacks good forwarding mechanisms). Using ssh agent forwarding
makes this feature easily usable in todays development environments
where code is often checked out in remote VMs / containers.
Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-git-1041%2FFStelzer%2Fsshsign-v1
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-git-1041/FStelzer/sshsign-v1
Pull-Request: https://github.com/git/git/pull/1041
Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 13 ++-
Documentation/config/user.txt | 4 +
gpg-interface.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
gpg-interface.h | 3 +
4 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index d94025cb368..fd71bd782ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ gpg.program::
gpg.format::
Specifies which key format to use when signing with `--gpg-sign`.
- Default is "openpgp" and another possible value is "x509".
+ Default is "openpgp". Other possible values are "x509", "ssh".
gpg.<format>.program::
Use this to customize the program used for the signing format you
chose. (see `gpg.program` and `gpg.format`) `gpg.program` can still
be used as a legacy synonym for `gpg.openpgp.program`. The default
- value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm".
+ value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm" and `gpg.ssh.program` is "ssh-keygen".
gpg.minTrustLevel::
Specifies a minimum trust level for signature verification. If
@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@ gpg.minTrustLevel::
with at least `undefined` trust. Setting this option overrides
the required trust-level for all operations. Supported values,
in increasing order of significance:
+
+gpg.ssh.allowedSigners::
+ A file containing all valid SSH signing principals.
+ Similar to an .ssh/authorized_keys file. See ssh-keygen(1) for details.
+ Defaults to .gitsigners
+
+gpg.ssh.revocationFile::
+ Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys.
+ See ssh-keygen(1) for details.
+
* `undefined`
* `never`
diff --git a/Documentation/config/user.txt b/Documentation/config/user.txt
index 59aec7c3aed..1632e7b320f 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/user.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/user.txt
@@ -36,3 +36,7 @@ user.signingKey::
commit, you can override the default selection with this variable.
This option is passed unchanged to gpg's --local-user parameter,
so you may specify a key using any method that gpg supports.
+ If gpg.format is set to "ssh" this needs to contain the valid
+ ssh public key (e.g.: "ssh-rsa XXXXXX identifier") which corresponds
+ to the private key used for signing. The private key needs to be available
+ via ssh-agent. Direct private key files are not supported yet.
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 127aecfc2b0..53504f64410 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include "tempfile.h"
static char *configured_signing_key;
+const char *ssh_allowed_signers, *ssh_revocation_file;
static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
struct gpg_format {
@@ -35,6 +36,14 @@ static const char *x509_sigs[] = {
NULL
};
+static const char *ssh_verify_args[] = {
+ NULL
+};
+static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
+ "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----",
+ NULL
+};
+
static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = {
{ .name = "openpgp", .program = "gpg",
.verify_args = openpgp_verify_args,
@@ -44,6 +53,9 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = {
.verify_args = x509_verify_args,
.sigs = x509_sigs
},
+ { .name = "ssh", .program = "ssh-keygen",
+ .verify_args = ssh_verify_args,
+ .sigs = ssh_sigs },
};
static struct gpg_format *use_format = &gpg_format[0];
@@ -144,6 +156,38 @@ static int parse_gpg_trust_level(const char *level,
return 1;
}
+static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+ const char *output = NULL;
+ char *next = NULL;
+
+ // ssh-keysign output should be:
+ // Good "git" signature for PRINCIPAL with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT
+
+ output = xmemdupz(sigc->gpg_status, strcspn(sigc->gpg_status, " \n"));
+ if (skip_prefix(sigc->gpg_status, "Good \"git\" signature for ", &output)) {
+ sigc->result = 'G';
+
+ next = strchrnul(output, ' ');
+ replace_cstring(&sigc->signer, output, next);
+ output = next + 1;
+ next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // 'with'
+ output = next + 1;
+ next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // KEY Type
+ output = next + 1;
+ next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // 'key'
+ output = next + 1;
+ next = strchrnul(output, ' '); // key
+ replace_cstring(&sigc->fingerprint, output, next);
+ } else {
+ sigc->result = 'B';
+ }
+
+ // SSH-Keygen prints onto stdout instead of stderr like the output code expects - so we just copy it over
+ free(sigc->gpg_output);
+ sigc->gpg_output = xmemdupz(sigc->gpg_status, strlen(sigc->gpg_status));
+}
+
static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
{
const char *buf = sigc->gpg_status;
@@ -262,11 +306,17 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size,
struct strbuf *gpg_output,
struct strbuf *gpg_status)
{
- struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+ struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT,
+ ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
struct gpg_format *fmt;
struct tempfile *temp;
int ret;
- struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *line;
+ size_t trust_size;
+ char *principal;
+ struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT,
+ principal_out = STRBUF_INIT,
+ principal_err = STRBUF_INIT;
temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX");
if (!temp)
@@ -283,24 +333,77 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size,
if (!fmt)
BUG("bad signature '%s'", signature);
- strvec_push(&gpg.args, fmt->program);
- strvec_pushv(&gpg.args, fmt->verify_args);
- strvec_pushl(&gpg.args,
- "--status-fd=1",
- "--verify", temp->filename.buf, "-",
- NULL);
+ if (!strcmp(use_format->name, "ssh")) {
+ // Find the principal from the signers
+ strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program);
+ strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-Y", "find-principals",
+ "-f", get_ssh_allowed_signers(),
+ "-s", temp->filename.buf,
+ NULL);
+ ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &principal_out, 0, &principal_err, 0);
+ if (strstr(principal_err.buf, "unknown option")) {
+ error(_("openssh version > 8.2p1 is needed for ssh signature verification (ssh-keygen needs -Y find-principals/verify option)"));
+ }
+ if (ret || !principal_out.len)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Iterate over all lines */
+ for (line = principal_out.buf; *line; line = strchrnul(line + 1, '\n')) {
+ while (*line == '\n')
+ line++;
+ if (!*line)
+ break;
- if (!gpg_status)
- gpg_status = &buf;
+ trust_size = strcspn(line, " \n");
+ principal = xmemdupz(line, trust_size);
- sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size,
- gpg_status, 0, gpg_output, 0);
- sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+ strvec_push(&gpg.args,fmt->program);
+ // We found principals - Try with each until we find a match
+ strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, "-Y", "verify",
+ "-n", "git",
+ "-f", get_ssh_allowed_signers(),
+ "-I", principal,
+ "-s", temp->filename.buf,
+ NULL);
- delete_tempfile(&temp);
+ if (ssh_revocation_file) {
+ strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, "-r", ssh_revocation_file, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (!gpg_status)
+ gpg_status = &buf;
+
+ sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size,
+ gpg_status, 0, gpg_output, 0);
+ sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
- ret |= !strstr(gpg_status->buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
+ ret |= !strstr(gpg_status->buf, "Good");
+ if (ret == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ strvec_push(&gpg.args, fmt->program);
+ strvec_pushv(&gpg.args, fmt->verify_args);
+ strvec_pushl(&gpg.args,
+ "--status-fd=1",
+ "--verify", temp->filename.buf, "-",
+ NULL);
+
+ if (!gpg_status)
+ gpg_status = &buf;
+
+ sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, gpg_status, 0,
+ gpg_output, 0);
+ sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+ ret |= !strstr(gpg_status->buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
+ }
+
+out:
+ delete_tempfile(&temp);
+ strbuf_release(&principal_out);
+ strbuf_release(&principal_err);
strbuf_release(&buf); /* no matter it was used or not */
return ret;
@@ -323,7 +426,11 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, plen);
sigc->gpg_output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_output, NULL);
sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_status, NULL);
- parse_gpg_output(sigc);
+ if (!strcmp(use_format->name, "ssh")) {
+ parse_ssh_output(sigc);
+ } else {
+ parse_gpg_output(sigc);
+ }
status |= sigc->result != 'G';
status |= sigc->trust_level < configured_min_trust_level;
@@ -394,6 +501,14 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
return 0;
}
+ if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.allowedsigners")) {
+ return git_config_string(&ssh_allowed_signers, var, value);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.revocationfile")) {
+ return git_config_string(&ssh_revocation_file, var, value);
+ }
+
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.format")) {
if (!value)
return config_error_nonbool(var);
@@ -425,6 +540,9 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.x509.program"))
fmtname = "x509";
+ if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.program"))
+ fmtname = "ssh";
+
if (fmtname) {
fmt = get_format_by_name(fmtname);
return git_config_string(&fmt->program, var, value);
@@ -437,7 +555,19 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void)
{
if (configured_signing_key)
return configured_signing_key;
- return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT|IDENT_NO_DATE);
+ if (!strcmp(use_format->name, "ssh")) {
+ // We could simply use the first key listed by ssh-add -L and risk signing with the wrong key
+ return "";
+ } else {
+ return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT | IDENT_NO_DATE);
+ }
+}
+
+const char *get_ssh_allowed_signers(void)
+{
+ if (ssh_allowed_signers)
+ return ssh_allowed_signers;
+ return GPG_SSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS;
}
int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key)
@@ -446,12 +576,35 @@ int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *sig
int ret;
size_t i, j, bottom;
struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT;
-
- strvec_pushl(&gpg.args,
- use_format->program,
- "--status-fd=2",
- "-bsau", signing_key,
- NULL);
+ struct tempfile *temp = NULL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(use_format->name, "ssh")) {
+ if (!signing_key)
+ return error(_("user.signingkey needs to be set to a ssh public key for ssh signing"));
+
+ // signing_key is a public ssh key
+ // FIXME: Allow specifying a key file so we can use private keyfiles instead of ssh-agent
+ temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_key_tmpXXXXXX");
+ if (!temp)
+ return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file"));
+ if (write_in_full(temp->fd, signing_key,
+ strlen(signing_key)) < 0 ||
+ close_tempfile_gently(temp) < 0) {
+ error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key to '%s'"), temp->filename.buf);
+ delete_tempfile(&temp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, use_format->program ,
+ "-Y", "sign",
+ "-n", "git",
+ "-f", temp->filename.buf,
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, use_format->program ,
+ "--status-fd=2",
+ "-bsau", signing_key,
+ NULL);
+ }
bottom = signature->len;
@@ -464,7 +617,16 @@ int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *sig
signature, 1024, &gpg_status, 0);
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
- ret |= !strstr(gpg_status.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] SIG_CREATED ");
+ if (temp)
+ delete_tempfile(&temp);
+
+ if (!strcmp(use_format->name, "ssh")) {
+ if (strstr(gpg_status.buf, "unknown option")) {
+ error(_("openssh version > 8.2p1 is needed for ssh signing (ssh-keygen needs -Y sign option)"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret |= !strstr(gpg_status.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] SIG_CREATED ");
+ }
strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
if (ret)
return error(_("gpg failed to sign the data"));
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 80567e48948..286c1b4167a 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ struct strbuf;
#define GPG_VERIFY_RAW 2
#define GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS 4
+#define GPG_SSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS ".gitsigners"
+
enum signature_trust_level {
TRUST_UNDEFINED,
TRUST_NEVER,
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
int git_gpg_config(const char *, const char *, void *);
void set_signing_key(const char *);
const char *get_signing_key(void);
+const char *get_ssh_allowed_signers(void);
int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
const char *signature, size_t slen,
struct signature_check *sigc);
base-commit: 670b81a890388c60b7032a4f5b879f2ece8c4558
--
gitgitgadget
