Re: [PATCH 00/10] [RFC] Simple IPC Mechanism

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Jeff Hostetler <git@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> On Windows a local named pipe is created by the server side.  It rejects
> remote connections.  I did not put an ACL, so it should inherit the
> system default which grants the user RW access (since the daemon is
> implicitly started by the first foreground client command that needs
> to talk to it.)  Other users in the user's group and the anonymous
> user should have R but not W access to it, so they could not be able
> to connect.  The name pipe is kept in the local Named Pipe File System
> (NPFS) as `\\.\pipe\<unique-path>` so it is globally visible on the
> system, but I don't think it is a problem.

It is not intuitively obvious why globalluy visible thing is OK to
me, but I'll take your word for it on stuff about Windows.

> On the Unix side, the socket is created inside the .git directory
> by the daemon.  Potential clients would have to have access to the
> working directory and the .git directory to connect to the socket,
> so in normal circumstances they would be able to read everything in
> the WD anyway.  So again, I don't think it is a problem.

OK, yes, writability to .git would automatically mean that
everything is a fair game to those who can talk to the daemon, so
there is no new issue here, as long as the first process that
creates the socket is careful not to loosen the permission.

Thanks.




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