Re: [PATCH 2/2] send-pack: check atomic push before running GPG

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在 2020/9/16 下午12:37, Junio C Hamano 写道:
Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@xxxxxxxxx> writes:

-
-     if (!args->dry_run && push_cert_nonce)
-             cmds_sent = generate_push_cert(&req_buf, remote_refs, args,
-                                            cap_buf.buf, push_cert_nonce);
-
       /*
        * Clear the status for each ref and see if we need to send
        * the pack data.
This "Clear the status for each ref" worries me.

The generate_push_cert() function RELIES on ref->status and filters
out the ref that failed to pass the local check from the generated
push certificate.  If you let the loop (post context of this hunk)
run, ref->status will be updated by it, so the net effect of this
patch is that it breaks "non-atomic" case that pushes multiple refs
and one of ref fails to pass the local check.

IOW, generate_push_cert() MUST be called before this loop "clears
the status for each ref" by assigning to ref->status.
The next block ("Finally, tell the other end!") is what we send
commands to "receive-pack", right after some of the status are reset
to REF_STATUS_OK or REF_STATUS_EXPECTING_REPORT by this chunk of code.
So moving the generate_push_cert() part right before the "Finally,
tell the other end!" part LGTM.
Sorry, I do not follow.  The loop in question is the one before
"Finally tell the other end".  The loop ends like so:

	for (ref = remote_refs; ref; ref = ref->next) {
		...
		if (args->dry_run || !status_report)
			ref->status = REF_STATUS_OK;
		else
			ref->status = REF_STATUS_EXPECTING_REPORT;
	}

and the patch moves a call to generate_push_cert() that looks at
remote_refs _after_ this loop, but generate_push_cert() function
uses a loop over remote_refs that uses check_to_send_update(), which
looks at ref->status's value to decide what to do.  Its correct
operation relies on ref->status NOT updated by the above loop.

The loop prepares the status field so that we can then read and
record the response against each ref updates from the other side.

The ref->status field is set to EXPECTING_REPORT, later to be
updated to REF_STATUS_OK or REF_STATUS_REMOTE_REJECT.  We can
clobber the original value of ref->status at this point only because
the loop depends on the fact that no check_to_send_update() call
will happen after the loop (because the ref->status field the
helper's operation depends on is already reset for the next phase of
operation).  The patch that moves generate_push_cert() call below
the loop, whether it is before or after the "Finally tell the other
end" loop, is therefore fundamentally broken, isn't it?

I do not think it would introduce such breakage if we teach
generate_push_cert() to pay attention to the atomicity, and that can
be done without reordering the calls in send_pack() to break the
control flow.

Thank you for your reply. These loops here really confuse me at first.

But I found that the main effect of "Clear the status for each ref and
see if we need to send the pack data" is to help us do a pre-check on
the client side whether the push should be rejected. When the reference
should be pushed, whether the status was changed to REF_STATUS_OK or
REF_STATUS_EXPECTING_REPORT, it does not seem to affect the result of
function generate_push_cert(). check_to_send_update() in
generate_push_cert() only filters out references that needn't to be pushed.

Just like brian m. carlson said, "that would be a nice change; after
all, the user's key may involve a smartcard or a passphrase and avoiding
needless hassle for the user would be desirable". It increase the
perforcemance a little bit for failed atomic push and make it clear that
client side requirements and the other side requirements.

If there is something wrong with my understanding, I am very grateful
\that you can help me point out the problems.



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