If we fail to load the oid from the index of a packfile, we'll die()
with an "internal error". But this should never happen: we'd fail here
only if the idx needed to be lazily opened (but we've already opened it)
or if we asked for an out-of-range index (but we're iterating using the
same count that we'd check the range against). A corrupted index might
have a bogus count (e.g., too large for its size), but we'd have
complained and aborted already when opening the index initially.
While we're here, we can add a few details so that if this bug ever
_does_ trigger, we'll have a bit more information.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@xxxxxxxx>
---
Most code in this situation doesn't even bother checking the return
value. So I would also be tempted to simply drop the conditional
entirely as unreachable.
pack-check.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/pack-check.c b/pack-check.c
index e4ef71c673..39196ecfbc 100644
--- a/pack-check.c
+++ b/pack-check.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static int verify_packfile(struct repository *r,
for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
entries[i].oid.hash = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, i);
if (!entries[i].oid.hash)
- die("internal error pack-check nth-packed-object");
+ BUG("unable to get oid of object %lu from %s",
+ (unsigned long)i, p->pack_name);
entries[i].offset = nth_packed_object_offset(p, i);
entries[i].nr = i;
}
--
2.25.1.823.g95c5488cf7
