On Sun, 22 Jul 2018 14:21:48 +0000, brian m. carlson wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 22, 2018 at 11:34:42AM +0200, Eric Deplagne wrote:
> > On Sat, 21 Jul 2018 23:59:41 +0000, brian m. carlson wrote:
> > > I don't know your colleagues, and they haven't commented here. One
> > > person that has commented here is Adam Langley. It is my impression
> > > (and anyone is free to correct me if I'm incorrect) that he is indeed a
> > > cryptographer. To quote him[0]:
> > >
> > > I think this group can safely assume that SHA-256, SHA-512, BLAKE2,
> > > K12, etc are all secure to the extent that I don't believe that making
> > > comparisons between them on that axis is meaningful. Thus I think the
> > > question is primarily concerned with performance and implementation
> > > availability.
> > >
> > > […]
> > >
> > > So, overall, none of these choices should obviously be excluded. The
> > > considerations at this point are not cryptographic and the tradeoff
> > > between implementation ease and performance is one that the git
> > > community would have to make.
> >
> > Am I completely out of the game, or the statement that
> > "the considerations at this point are not cryptographic"
> > is just the wrongest ?
> >
> > I mean, if that was true, would we not be sticking to SHA1 ?
>
> I snipped a portion of the context, but AGL was referring to the
> considerations involved in choosing from the proposed ones for NewHash.
> In context, he meant that the candidates for NewHash “are all secure”
> and are therefore a better choice than SHA-1.
Maybe a little bit sensitive, but I really did read
"we don't care if it's weak or strong, that's not the matter".
> I think we can all agree that SHA-1 is weak and should be replaced.
> --
> brian m. carlson: Houston, Texas, US
> OpenPGP: https://keybase.io/bk2204
--
Eric Deplagne
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