On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 06:59:43AM +0800, Luat Nguyen wrote: > Recently, I’ve found a security issue related to out-of-bound read at function named `ewah_read_mmap` Thanks, this is definitely a bug worth addressing. But note... > Assume that, an attacker can put malicious `./git/index` into a repo by somehow. We generally don't consider .git/index (or pack .bitmap files, which also use this implementation) to be a major part of Git's attack surface, since they are generated locally. And if you can write to somebody's .git directory, there are already much easier ways to execute arbitrary code. > Since there is lack of check whether the remaining size of `ptr`is > equal to `buffer_size` or not. Yep. We also fail to check if we even have enough bytes to read the buffer_size in the first place. Here are some patches. The first one fixes the problem you found. The second one drops some dead code that has a related problem. And the third just drops some dead code that I noticed in the same file. :) [1/3]: ewah_read_mmap: bounds-check mmap reads [2/3]: ewah: drop ewah_deserialize function [3/3]: ewah: drop ewah_serialize_native function ewah/ewah_io.c | 106 ++++++++-------------------------------- ewah/ewok.h | 4 +- t/t5310-pack-bitmaps.sh | 13 +++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) -Peff
