Hi, Santiago Torres wrote: >> In contrast, working on hash-function-transition.txt? That >> seems like it'd easily consume many person-months of work. >> And that plan only exists post-shatter.io, whereas git-evtag >> long predates both. > > I think this is partly true. A hash transition has been brought up > multiple times pre-shattered. In my opinion shattered was a much-needed > PR push for SHA1 deprecation. In practice, things changed very little. Sure, the main relevant things that changed are: 1. The sha1collisiondetection library became well known, which if anything makes moving off of SHA-1 *less* urgent than before (but still urgent). and 2. We came up with and agreed on a design for a transition off of SHA-1 that we are (slowly but surely) executing on. This means it's a good time to help get it done. >>> Personally I'd dislike to include ev-tags as it might send a signal >>> of "papering over sha1 issues instead of fixing it". >> >> I don't agree. I think it's pretty clear that a hash function transition >> would be a huge amount of work - not least because of course >> there are now at least two widely used implementations of git in C, >> plus https://www.eclipse.org/jgit/ plus... > > I agree with Stefan here. I think it's better in the long-term to > push for hash-agnosticity. I don't know if git-evtag is hash agnostic, > but if it is not, then we have two transition plans to think about. I don't think there's even a question here: Git has to transition off of SHA-1. In that context, Stefan's comment is a welcome one: once we've transitioned off of SHA-1, having a separate evtag feature would make git more complicated without any benefit to match. To put it another way, the gpgsig-sha256 field described in Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt provides essentially the same functionality as an evtag. What's missing is an implementation of it. I'm happy to help in any way I can (reviews, advice, etc). [...] > Full disclosure, I published a "competing" solution a couple of years > ago[1] but, in my personal opinion, I think push certificates can > achieve the same security guarantees as my system with very little > changes. Work to improve the usability of push certs would also be very very welcome. Thanks and hope that helps, Jonathan > [1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/torres-arias