Re: [PATCH v3] fetch-pack: always allow fetching of literal SHA1s

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On 05/11, Jeff King wrote:
> On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 03:11:57PM -0700, Jonathan Tan wrote:
> 
> > fetch-pack, when fetching a literal SHA-1 from a server that is not
> > configured with uploadpack.allowtipsha1inwant (or similar), always
> > returns an error message of the form "Server does not allow request for
> > unadvertised object %s". However, it is sometimes the case that such
> > object is advertised. This situation would occur, for example, if a user
> > or a script was provided a SHA-1 instead of a branch or tag name for
> > fetching, and wanted to invoke "git fetch" or "git fetch-pack" using
> > that SHA-1.
> > 
> > Teach fetch-pack to also check the SHA-1s of the refs in the received
> > ref advertisement if a literal SHA-1 was given by the user.
> 
> Stepping back a bit, what does this mean for a world where we implement
> protocol extensions to let the client specify a set of refspecs to limit
> the advertisement?
> 
> If we give the server our usual set of fetch refspecs, then we might
> fail to fulfill a request that would have been advertised outside of
> that set. And the behavior is confusing and non-transparent to the user.
> I don't think that really makes sense, though; the advertisement we ask
> for from the server should include only the bits we're interested in for
> _this_ fetch.
> 
> If we tell the server "we are interested in abcd1234", then it's not
> going to find any matching ref by name, obviously. So should servers
> then treat 40-hex names in the incoming refspecs as a request to show
> any names which have a matching sha1? That works against any server-side
> optimizations to avoid looking at the complete set of refs, but it would
> only have to kick in when the user actually specified a single SHA-1
> (and even then only when allowAnySHA1 isn't on). So that's probably
> workable.
> 
> None of this is your problem now either way; the advertisement-limiting
> extension is still vaporware, albeit one we've discussed a lot. I just
> wanted to make sure we weren't painting ourselves into any corners. And
> I think this case could probably be handled.

I can't remember, is there any reason why it is still vaporware? As in
what is holding us back from doing the advertisement-limiting (or doing
away with the initial ref  advertisement)?

-- 
Brandon Williams



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