On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 12:40:29PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> > Here's that minor tweak, in case anybody is interested. It's less useful
> > without that follow-on that touches "eol" more, but perhaps it increases
> > readability on its own.
>
> Yup, the only thing that the original (with Brian's fix) appears to
> be more careful about is it tries very hard to avoid setting boc
> past eoc. As we are not checking "boc != eoc" but doing the
> comparison, that "careful" appearance does not give us any benefit
> in practice, other than having to do an extra "eol ? eol+1 : eoc";
> the result of this patch is easier to read.
>
> By the way, eoc is "one past the end" of the array that begins at
> boc, so setting a pointer to eoc+1 may technically be in violation.
> I do not know how much it matters, though ;-)
I think that is OK. We are reading a strbuf, so eoc must either be the
first character of the PGP signature, or the terminating NUL if there
was no signature block[1]. So it's actually _inside_ the array, and
eoc+1 is our "one past".
-Peff
[1] Arguably we should bail when parse_signature() does not find a PGP
signature at all. We already bail with "malformed push certificate"
when there are other syntactic anomalies.