Re: SHA1 collisions found

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On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Jeff King <peff@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Yeah, they're not expensive. We've discussed enabling them by default.
> The sticking point is that there is old history with minor bugs which
> triggers some warnings (e.g., malformed committer names), and it would
> be annoying to start rejecting that unconditionally.
>
> So I think we would need a good review of what is a "warning" versus an
> "error", and to only reject on errors (right now the NUL thing is a
> warning, and it should probably upgraded).

I think even a warning (as opposed to failing the operation) is
already a big deal.

If people start saying "why do I get this odd warning", and start
looking into it, that's going to be a pretty strong defense against
bad behavior. SCM attacks depend on flying under the radar.

>> So a very powerful defense is to just look for those bit patterns in
>> the objects, and just warn about them. Those patterns don't tend to
>> exist in normal inputs anyway, but particularly if you just warn, it's
>> a heads-ups that "ok, something iffy is going on"
>
> Yes, that would be a wonderful hardening to put into Git if we know what
> those patterns look like. That part isn't clear to me.

There's actually already code for that, pointed to by the shattered project:

  https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection

the "meat" of that check is in lib/ubc_check.c.

                  Linus



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