Re: [PATCH] fetch/push: document that private data can be leaked

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On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 11:00:04AM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:

> Matt McCutchen <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
> >> Yup, and then "do not push to untrustworthy place without checking
> >> what you are pushing", too?
> >
> > If there is no private data in the repository, then there is no need
> > for the user to check what they are pushing. As I've indicated before,
> > IMO manually checking each push would not be a workable security
> > measure in the long term anyway.
> 
> Then what is?  Don't answer; this is a rhetorical question.
> 
> The answer is "do not push to untrustworthy place", if you are
> unable to check what you are pushing.

I think "check what you are pushing" only covers one case (attacker lies
to you during a fetch, and you accidentally push that back, thinking
they already have it).

But consider the other case mentioned: the attacker lies to you while
pushing and _says_ they have X, then deduces information from the delta
you generate. The only advice there is "do not push to an untrusted
place from a repository containing private objects".

So I think the in-between answer is "it is OK to push to an
untrustworthy place, but do not do it from a repo that may contain
secret contents".

-Peff



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