Matt McCutchen <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> I was studying the fetch protocol and I realized that in a scenario in
> which a client regularly fetches a set of refs from a server and pushes
> them back without careful scrutiny, the server can steal the targets of
> unrelated refs from the client repository by fabricating its own refs
> to the "have" objects specified by the client during the fetch.
Let me see if I understood your scenario correctly.
Suppose we start from this history where 'O' are common, your victim
has a 'Y' branch with two commits that are private to it, as well as
a 'X' branch on which it has X1 that it previously obtained from the
server. On the other hand, the server does not know about Y1 or Y2,
and it added one commit X2 to the branch 'x' the victim is
following:
victim server
Y1---Y2
/
---O---O---X1 ---O---O---X1---X2
Then when victim wants to fetch 'x' from the server, it would say
have X1, have Y2, have Y1, have O
and gets told to shut up by the server who heard enough. The
histories on these two parties will then become like this:
victim server
Y1---Y2
/
---O---O---X1---X2 ---O---O---X1---X2
Victim wishes to keep Y1 and Y2 private, but pushes some other
branch (perhaps builds X3 on top of X2 and pushes 'x'). On push
protocol, the server would lie to the victim that it has Y2 without
knowing what they are.
Is that how your attack scenario goes?