On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Santiago Torres <santiago@xxxxxxx> wrote: > Hello everyone, > > I'm Santiago, a PhD student at NYU doing research about secure software > development pipelines. We've been studying different aspects of Git > lately, (as it is an integral part of many projects) and we believe > we've found a vulnerabilty in the way Git structures/signs metadata. > > An attacker capable of performing as a Man in the Middle between a > GitHub server and a developer is able to trick such developer into > merging vulnerable commit objects, or omit security patches --- even if > all users sign all commit objects. Given that Git metadata is unsigned, > it can be modified to provide incorrect views of a repository to > downstream developers. > > An example of a malicious commit merge follows: > > 1) The attacker controlling or acting as the upstream server identifies > two branches: one in which the unsuspecting developer is working on, and > another in which a vulnerable piece of code is located. > > 2) Branch pointers are modified: the packed-refs file (or ref/heads/*) > is edited so that the master branch points to the vulnerable commit > object. Having performed the change, no additional configuration must be > made by the attacker, who now waits for an unsuspecting developer to > pull. > > 3) Once a developer pulls, he or she will be prompted to merge his code > with the new change-set (the vulnerable commit). This operation will > only resemble developer negligence. If no conflicts arise, the attack > will pass unsuspected. > > 4) The developer pushes to upstream. All the traffic can be re-routed > back to the original repository. The target branch now contains a > vulnerable piece of code. > > We have identified additional attack scenarios for modifying the > metadata that result in a incorrect state of the target repository, and > we are ready to disclose information about other variants of this attack > as well. > > We also designed a backwards-compatible defense mechanism to prevent > attacks based on Git metadata tampering. Also we implemented a proof of > concept of the scheme, and performed timing, stress and concurrency > tests; our results show that the overhead should be minimal, even in > large software repositories such as the Linux Kernel. > > We already approached people from CERT and GitHub regarding this attack > scenario, and we'd also like to hear your comments regarding this. This is what push certificates ought to solve. The server records all pushes and its signed certificates of pushes and by the difference of the refs (either in packed refs or as a loose ref) to the push certificate this tampering of the server can be detected. The push certs can however not be obtained via Git itself (they are just stored on the server for now for later inspection or similar), because to be really sure the client would need to learn about these push certificates out of band. The model there would be: * A vulnerable piece of software exists. * It get's fixed (and the fix is pushed with a signed push) * the MITM server doesn't show the fix (show the code from before fix) nor the push certificate thereof * client still pulls vulnerable code This model shows the distribution of push certs via the server itself may not be optimal. Thanks for researching on Git, Stefan > > Thanks! > -Santiago. > > P.S. We also elaborate more about this attack vector in this document: > https://drive.google.com/a/nyu.edu/file/d/0B2KBm0fULlS1RDR5UHVESjVua3M/view?usp=sharing > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe git" in > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe git" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html