On 2014-12-23 09.45, Jeff King wrote:
> Our is_hfs_dotgit function relies on the hackily-implemented
> next_hfs_char to give us the next character that an HFS+
> filename comparison would look at. It's hacky because it
> doesn't implement the full case-folding table of HFS+; it
> gives us just enough to see if the path matches ".git".
>
> At the end of next_hfs_char, we use tolower() to convert our
> 32-bit code point to lowercase. Our tolower() implementation
> only takes an 8-bit char, though; it throws away the upper
> 24 bits. This means we can't have any false negatives for
> is_hfs_dotgit. We only care about matching 7-bit ASCII
> characters in ".git", and we will correctly process 'G' or
> 'g'.
>
> However, we _can_ have false positives. Because we throw
> away the upper bits, code point \u{0147} (for example) will
> look like 'G' and get downcased to 'g'. It's not known
> whether a sequence of code points whose truncation ends up
> as ".git" is meaningful in any language, but it does not
> hurt to be more accurate here. We can just pass out the full
> 32-bit code point, and compare it manually to the upper and
> lowercase characters we care about.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@xxxxxxxx>
> ---
> I saw Linus ask about this on G+. I had done the "no false
> negative" analysis when writing the patch, but didn't
> consider the false positive.
>
> Another way of accomplishing the same thing is for next_hfs_char to
> continue folding case, but _only_ do so for 8-bit code points. Like:
>
Don't we have the same possible problem under NTFS?
Under Linux + VFAT ?
Under all OS + VFAT ?
And would it make sense to turn this
> return (out & 0xffffff00) ? out : tolower(out);
into this:
static ucs_char_t unicode_tolower(ucs_char_t ch) {
return (ch & 0xffffff00) ? ch : tolower(ch);
}
And what happens if I export NTFS to Mac OS X?
(Other combinations possible)
Shouldn't fsck under all OS warn for NTFS and hfs possible attacks ?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe git" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html