Re: [PATCH 4/4] resolve_ref_unsafe(): close race condition reading loose refs

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On 06/13/2013 10:22 AM, Thomas Rast wrote:
> Michael Haggerty <mhagger@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
>> One race is still possible and undetected: another process could
>> change the file from a regular file into a symlink between the call to
>> lstat and the call to open().  The open() call would silently follow
>> the symlink and not know that something is wrong.  I don't see a way
>> to detect this situation without the use of the O_NOFOLLOW option,
>> which is not portable and is not used elsewhere in our code base.
>>
>> However, we don't use symlinks anymore, so this situation is unlikely.
>> And it doesn't appear that treating a symlink as a regular file would
>> have grave consequences; after all, this is exactly how the code
>> handles non-relative symlinks.
> 
> You could fstat() the fd you got from open(), and verify that it is
> still the same inode/device.  That's wasting one syscall per ref for
> pretty much everyone, but perhaps if we really cared about this (and I
> gather from the above that we don't), we could conditionally use
> O_NOFOLLOW if available, otherwise do that fstat().

Yes, that would work.  For now I think I will not worry about it, but
I'll keep your trick in mind.

Thanks,
Michael

-- 
Michael Haggerty
mhagger@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://softwareswirl.blogspot.com/
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