Re: Commit signing

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On Monday 2007, January 15 18:36, Martin Langhoff wrote:

> >  * Vandal spends one year developing reasonable relationship with Idiot,
> > all patches are good.  Occasional big patches are pulled by Idiot.
>
> If you are using signatures, the trojan horse would make sure he gets
> his patches signed. What is the advantage again?

He can't sign it as someone else, and so when it is eventually discovered the 
culprit can be hunted down and flogged.

> IIRC Linus discussed this early on, and his view was that authorship
> only gives you false security. The only security is in reviewing code.
> And that the code-signed patches are dog-slow too.

Eh? It's only a little bit of extra text to carry around.  It's signed by the 
original author when it enters a repository, so it's not a huge price to pay 
in any one place.  The checking, if you wanted to enable it, would only be 
done once per incoming commit to a master repository.  All-in-all, nothing 
that you wouldn't be willing to pay if you wanted this feature.

As an aside; I would also suggest that this isn't just about people trojaning 
a commit.  You could also argue that without it, this whole Signed-Off-By 
business is a bit a moot point.

The signed-off-by lines in the kernel are being used to establish original 
authorship and entry path of every line in the kernel.  It's fairly worthless 
though when the "signing" is just someone writing an easily forged line of 
text.  For example, what is to stop that naughty lad Linus from adding some 
code the infringes a copyright to the kernel and adding a "Signed-Off-By: 
Martin Langhoff" to the bottom?  Equally, when SCO come knocking with 
their "we wrote that line", a secure digital signature chain would go a long 
way to proving that a submission wasn't faked.

I'm not sure how far commit signing would go towards preventing that, but it 
could certainly be part of the solution.  Commit signing doesn't have to be 
all about trusting developers, it can be about recording history in an 
independently checkable way.



Andy

-- 
Dr Andrew Parkins, M Eng (Hons), AMIEE
andyparkins@xxxxxxxxx
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