We format the password prompt in an 80-character static
buffer. It contains the remote host and username, so it's
unlikely to overflow (or be exploitable by a remote
attacker), but there's no reason not to be careful and use
a strbuf.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@xxxxxxxx>
---
Just something I noticed while doing the cleanup in the next patch.
imap-send.c | 7 ++++---
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c
index e1ad1a4..4c1e897 100644
--- a/imap-send.c
+++ b/imap-send.c
@@ -1209,9 +1209,10 @@ static int auth_cram_md5(struct imap_store *ctx, struct imap_cmd *cmd, const cha
goto bail;
}
if (!srvc->pass) {
- char prompt[80];
- sprintf(prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host);
- arg = git_getpass(prompt);
+ struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
+ strbuf_addf(&prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host);
+ arg = git_getpass(prompt.buf);
+ strbuf_release(&prompt);
if (!arg) {
perror("getpass");
exit(1);
--
1.7.8.rc2.8.gf0f4f
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